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Change, Transition, or Cycle 
The Dynamics of Ukraine’s Political Regime in 
2004–2010
democratization in ukraine has followed a zigzag course. the positive 
results of the change of leadership brought about by the orange revolution 
of 2004 were modest and in some respects temporary and did not amount 
to a change of political regime. the author considers future scenarios and 
concludes that neither the consolidation of liberal democracy nor a return 
to authoritarianism is likely. 
The problem of political and social transformation is of considerable 
theoretical and practical significance for societies undergoing change. 
One such society is Ukraine.
The dramatic events in Ukraine at the end of 2004 stimulated lively 
debate about the essence of the Orange Revolution; this debate produced 
certain predictions concerning possible directions of change in state and 
society. Today it is interesting to compare the initial conclusions and ap-
praisals of various colleagues. The chief question that prompted this inves-
tigation remains relevant even today. Did the political regime in Ukraine 
change after the Orange Revolution, and should we expect regime change 
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after the election of Viktor Yanukovych as the country’s president? In the 
last five years, quite a few works have appeared that offer explanations for 
the sources of regime competitiveness and for the change of leadership 
in Ukraine in 2004, as well as comparative analysis of the characteristics 
that distinguish this institutional system and its evolving regime (D’Anieri 
2006; Gel’man 2007, pp. 81–109; Hale 2006, pp. 305–29; Way 2005, pp. 
231–61). Nevertheless, the question has as yet no clear answer. In this 
article, therefore, I focus on the transformation of the political regime in 
Ukraine during the 2004–8 period. I also take into account events since the 
2010 presidential elections. I try to answer several questions:
—What type of political regime took shape in Ukraine during the 
presidency of Leonid Kuchma?
—Is leadership change in Ukraine evolutionary or revolutionary in 
nature?
—Why, during the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, did the Ukrainian 
elite not start to “play by the rules,” as certain researchers anticipated 
(Gel’man 2007, p. 99), but instead continued to “play with the rules”?
—With the election of Yanukovych as president of Ukraine, could the 
country slide toward authoritarianism?
In this investigation, I use an institutional approach to explain the tra-
jectory of regime transformation (Fishman 1990, pp. 422–40; Macridis 
1986; Munck 1996; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). In contrast to the 
procedural approach of the post-Soviet research tradition and the actor-
centered approach of some Western scholars, here a regime is considered 
an aggregate of formal and informal rules that require, permit, or prohibit 
various actions. These rules determine who holds power (that is, has 
the right to make decisions). At the same time—through the separation 
of powers—the rules determine and constrain interaction at the center of 
political power (horizontal ties among the branches of power), as well as 
the relationship between the state and the rest of society (vertical ties). 
Recognition of the rules by all major political players is a condition of 
regime consolidation (Skaaning).
In analyzing political regimes, one must bear in mind that a change in 
leadership or in the identity of the chief power holders does not neces-
sarily lead to regime change. Also, regime change may occur (although 
this happens much more rarely) without a change of leadership (the shift 
from parliamentary to prime-ministerial governance under Margaret 
Thatcher) or a change in the form of governance (the Nazi accession to 
power in Germany).
10 russian  politics  and  law
In this investigation, I define a political regime as an institutionalized 
aggregate of formal and informal rules that determine horizontal and 
vertical constraints on methods of exercising power and on interactions 
among power holders and between them and the rest of society.
Study of the Political Regime in Ukraine in 1994–2004
Under the Kuchma presidency, one topic that the authorities did not like to 
see analyzed was the type of political regime in Ukraine. Official ideolo-
gists actively promoted the idea that Ukraine had been in transition since 
1991, moving from totalitarianism toward democracy. Democratization 
was supposed to end with the formation of a welfare state based on law, 
a civil society, and a market economy.
In the mid-1990s Ukrainian intellectuals realized that the declared 
goals diverged from daily political practice, and this understanding 
later spread to a substantial number of Ukrainian citizens. Only a few 
researchers directly engaged in study of the political regime did not en-
tertain illusions regarding its democratic nature, but they had important 
disagreements over how to characterize the type of regime. Some used 
categories of “neototalitarianism” (Polokhalo 1992, 1996, 1998); others 
proposed to call it “neopatrimonial” (Fisun 2006, pp. 150–78); and a 
third group avoided specific labels, preferring the concept “transitional” 
(Kolodii 1999, pp. 84–96). These divergent appraisals probably reflect the 
“catch-up” nature of political-science research in Ukraine, which even 
today suffers from excessive description and normativity. 
While Ukrainian researchers have concentrated on determining the 
degree to which the political regime in Ukraine has moved away from 
the classical Soviet model, Western theorists have tried to place the 
Ukrainian case in a broader theoretical and comparative context. As a 
result, certain concepts have appeared to explain the special features of 
post-Soviet transformation in Ukraine.
Attempts to extend the model of democratic transition in Latin America 
to post-Soviet reality have given rise to critical appraisals of the expedi-
ency of such an approach. Paul Kubicek, and later Thomas Carothers, 
criticized the idea that democratic transformation is irreversible in coun-
tries with an authoritarian past. Kubicek observed that the special features 
of the corporate state order in Ukraine under the Kuchma presidency 
brought it close to Latin American countries. He called Ukraine and 
Russia in the mid-1990s “delegative democracies,” whose populations 
remain passive in the period between elections.1
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Taras Kuzio, a British political scientist of Ukrainian origin, clari-
fies the thesis—popular among transitologists—that Ukraine under the 
Kuchma presidency was a “delegative democracy.” This idea, according to 
Kuzio, applies only to southern and eastern Ukraine, where the population 
was politically active mainly during electoral campaigns. Inhabitants of 
the western and central regions of Ukraine maintained civic and political 
activism between elections (Kuzio 2005, p. 270).
Kuzio, following Carothers and some other Western researchers, called 
Ukraine a “hybrid state” with a competitive authoritarian regime. A hybrid 
state combines remnants of the old Soviet system with new economic and 
political institutions. A regime of competitive authoritarianism (according 
to Kuzio) is defined by the presence of two tendencies: the dominance of 
oligarchs under the cover of centrist parties in parliament; and the activ-
ity of an opposition that prevents oligarchic groups from establishing a 
completely authoritarian regime. Disunity among the pro-regime politi-
cal elite under Kuchma, combined with a relatively strong opposition, 
prevented the establishment of a full-fledged authoritarian regime.
In Kuzio’s opinion, the unstable equilibrium that emerged in Ukraine 
during the Kuchma presidency could shift toward authoritarian consolida-
tion if Yanukovych won the presidential elections or toward democratic 
consolidation if Yushchenko won. What happened in Ukraine after the 
Orange Revolution, however, showed that the latter expectation was 
erroneous.
In addition to Kuzio’s view, let us note the idea of Ukraine as a hybrid 
state with electoral authoritarianism put forward by Paul D’Anieri, which 
focuses on the influence that Soviet institutions exert on the political 
system, the practice of governance, and the reform process. 
Keith Darden, an American, has proposed a cogent explanation of the 
mechanism of authoritarian state control in Ukraine and other post-So-
viet republics. He describes Ukraine under the Kuchma presidency as a 
“blackmail state.” The mechanism of state blackmail consisted of three 
elements: the state leaders’ tolerant attitude toward corruption; the lead-
ers’ use of the apparatus of state surveillance to gather “compromising 
material” [kompromat] against middle- and lower-ranking officials; and 
selective application of the law. The payment for the authorities’ indul-
gence was political loyalty to the regime, while the reward for loyalty 
was inclusion in corrupt arrangements. Officials or even ordinary citizens 
who did not agree with the regime could be crushed at any moment 
with the aid of the tax administration or other state structures (Darden 
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2001, pp. 67–71). The Ukrainian journalist Mykola Riabchuk (2004) 
used Darden’s model to illustrate the mechanisms by which power was 
exercised during the Kuchma presidency.
Ukraine, like most post-Soviet states, clearly exhibits the neopatri-
monial type of power, as distinct from the rational-bureaucratic Western 
type. Several researchers point to this circumstance (Fisun 2006, pp. 
150–78; Fisun 2007, pp. 123–37; Shevchuk 2000, pp. 7–12). Hans van 
Zon (2005, pp. 12–22) calls the Kuchma regime “bureaucratic” but the 
state neopatrimonial: “Ukraine does not have a consolidated, modern 
state apparatus but, rather, is a neo-patrimonial state in which each civil 
servant has his own fief. The state apparatus resembles a mosaic of sepa-
rate institutions more concerned with safeguarding their own privileges 
than with serving society” (ibid., p. 15).
As we see, most scholars define the political regime in Ukraine dur-
ing the Kuchma presidency as undemocratic, using terms ranging from 
neototalitarian (Vladimir Polokhalo) to competitive semiauthoritarian 
(Kuzio). This diversity of appraisals reflects fluctuations in the essence 
of the regime itself, which over ten years passed through several evolu-
tionary stages. Informal rules of the “political game” predominated in 
Ukraine under Kuchma and throughout the Yushchenko presidency. But 
even these rules were and are broken by the chief political players. This 
throws light on the reasons why there have been several political crises 
in Ukraine following changes in leadership.
In my view, the political regime in Ukraine during the last years of the 
Kuchma presidency may be regarded as a pyramid of informal, institu-
tionalized rules for exercising power. At the top of this pyramid sat the 
president, who himself set the rules although he did not succeed in fully 
subordinating the “oligarchs” and preventing a coordinated opposition, 
as Putin did in Russia. Those who remained with Kuchma—his imme-
diate entourage (the presidential administration) and certain members 
of his family—“played by the rules,” supported them, and therefore 
constituted the second level of influence. The third and final level of in-
fluence comprised certain competing financial–industrial groups. Those 
who supported the informal rules and power of the president received 
regional privileges in exchange. By contrast, those who tried to create a 
coordinated alternative—that is, who violated, opposed, or tried to change 
the rules—were either discredited by the authorities (Pavlo Lazarenko) 
or repudiated and subjected to direct (Yulia Tymoshenko) or indirect 
(Yushchenko) persecution. This kind of regime may be characterized 
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as weak patrimonial–oligarchic authoritarianism or as unconsolidated 
patrimonial oligopoly.
Revolution or Protest?
Most Ukrainian researchers and some Western scholars describe the 
events of November–December 2004 as a revolution.2 The most thor-
ough attempts to substantiate the revolutionary nature of these events 
in political-science terms are, in my view, those of Antonina Kolodii 
(2005) and Valentin Yakushik (2006, pp. 19–36). In brief, they argue that 
what took place in Ukraine was not a social but a political revolution. 
Unlike a social revolution, which is accompanied by violence, a political 
revolution is possible without it. In Ukraine, however, the revolutionary 
character of events manifested itself in forcible mass action (Yakushik) 
or in coercive removal from power (Kolodii). As a result of the revolu-
tion, Ukraine underwent a change in political regime.
In my view, it is incorrect to divide revolutions into social and political. 
Karl Marx first employed the concept of political revolution to denote the 
initial stage of social revolution (Marks 1959, p. 94). According to Marx, 
each social revolution results from a political revolution that overthrows 
the old state power through an uprising. For Marx as a dialectical thinker, 
political revolution and social revolution were stages in a single process. 
Ukrainian scholars have ignored this thesis, dividing the unified concept 
of revolution into two types—social and political.
I think the use of “political revolution” arose from a felt need to sub-
stantiate the revolutionary nature of the events of late 2004 despite the 
absence of violence. A political revolution as understood by Yakushik 
and Kolodii sounds like a euphemism for a political coup. In Ukraine, 
however, there was neither a revolution nor a coup. it would be more 
accurate to call the events of november–december 2004 in ukraine a 
wide-ranging political protest, planned by opposition leaders and sup-
ported by a large number of ukrainian citizens, that led to Kuchma’s 
removal from power.
Statements about the “extralegal nature of forcible mass action” or 
“coercive removal from power” are also vulnerable to criticism. The 
blocking by protestors of the government building, the closing of roads, 
Yushchenko’s “taking of the oath,” the promulgation of decrees by the 
“Committee of National Salvation”—actions that Yakushik calls “sys-
tematic direct pressure by the broad revolutionary masses” on various 
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branches and bodies of government—really aimed at exerting pressure 
on the authorities, nothing more.
Yakushik and Kolodii do not explain what, in their opinion, constitutes 
the essence of forcible actions or coercion. In Yakushik’s interpretation, 
“forcible actions” and “pressure” are phenomena of the same order. I, 
however, disagree. Forcible actions presuppose the use of coercion and 
find expression through physical confrontation. The essence of political 
pressure, by contrast, is an attempt to influence political decision making 
to ensure results desired by the initiator of the pressure. Thus, pressure 
cannot be direct; only coercion in the form of physical violence can be 
direct.
The above-cited actions, as Yakushik admits, “are specific indicators 
not only of a revolution. They are indicators common to a revolution, a 
rebellion, an uprising, and a coup” (2006, p. 27). In my opinion, such 
actions should be regarded as characteristics of political protest rather 
than indicators of revolution or of forcible actions, for they were not. 
After all, the decision to annul the results of the second round of the 
presidential elections was taken not on Independence Square but in the 
Supreme Court. However political the nature of this decision, the ruling 
made it possible to exit the crisis without the use of force. The fact of 
Yanukovych’s participation in the third round of elections, despite politi-
cal declarations concerning its illegitimacy, shows that he and the mem-
bers of his team accepted the verdict of the Supreme Court. In addition, 
the “round tables” at which the presidential candidates and the acting 
president reached a political compromise were an example of political 
crisis resolution and not of coercive removal from power.
Finally, the new team that came to power did not succeed in changing 
the fundamental “rules of the game” that determine the principles guid-
ing the exercise of power or the political regime (the latter thesis will be 
developed below)—which confirms the inaccuracy of calling the events 
of late 2004 in Ukraine a revolution (even a political revolution)
What kinds of events can be considered a revolution? Samuel Hun-
tington, considering revolutions in the context of modernization, lists 
several characteristics: (1) the use of force; (2) profound, fundamen-
tal change in the existing system and social structure; and (3) radical 
change in political institutions and in the entire political system (1986, 
p. 39).3 Theda Skocpol and Ellen Trimberger, adherents of the structural 
theory of revolution, specify three necessary and sufficient conditions 
of revolution: (1) international pressure from more developed states; 
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(2) conflict between traditional elites and the state; and (3) organized 
mass mobilization from below, directed against local representatives 
of the central authorities (1986, pp. 59–65). Jack Goldstone, the most 
authoritative contemporary investigator of revolution, summing up the 
achievements of the fourth generation of researchers into revolution, lists 
five requirements: (1) a crisis of the state; (2) sharp polarization among 
the elite; (3) a crisis of popular welfare; (4) emergence of a coalition 
between part of the elite and the popular masses; and (5) existence of 
some opposition ideology that unites elite and masses in their struggle 
against the authorities (2003, pp. 81–82).
Of Goldstone’s five conditions, only two were present in Ukraine—a 
split within the elite and extensive (ideological) mobilization by the op-
position, primarily of inhabitants of western and central Ukraine. Con-
currently, supporters of presidential candidate Yanukovych engaged in 
the intensive (administrative) mobilization of inhabitants of eastern and 
southern Ukraine. The virtual lines of division that emerged within the 
elite during the struggle for power in anticipation of President Kuchma’s 
departure did not coincide with the technology of civilizational schism 
created by Yanukovych’s Russian political technologists. Revolutions 
do not happen in individual regions. A revolution presupposes mass 
mobilization on the basis of class, religion, ideology, ethnicity, or some 
combination thereof. The worst to which the technology of cultural and 
ethnic confrontation might have led is civil war—not revolution.
Moreover, the social architecture and the quality and structure of the 
elite remained unchanged with the change of leadership in Ukraine. The 
imbalances in society have been preserved: the size of the middle class has 
never exceeded 15 percent of the population, and the elite is replenished 
through reproduction, not circulation (Matsievs’kii 2010, pp. 38–55). If 
to this we add that revolutions are usually processes that last from a few 
months to several years and activate all social strata (that is, macro events), 
then it becomes clearly problematic to recognize the events of late 2004 
in Ukraine as a revolution. At the same time, these events did have certain 
revolutionary features: a political crisis, beginning with the announced 
results of the second round of elections and ending with the Supreme 
Court ruling that invalidated the results and mandated a new vote; political 
mobilization of a considerable number of citizens; confrontation between 
the authorities and the opposition; and political polarization in society. 
Nevertheless, these are not sufficient grounds to define the given events 
as a revolution, rebellion, putsch, or coup. The Orange Revolution may 
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be regarded as an event and as part of a broader process. It is better, in my 
view, to conduct separate analyses through the prism of political sociology 
at the micro and macro levels. The micro level indicates the trend among the 
elite, the macro level the trend in social structure. This approach enables us 
to conclude that ukraine underwent a nonviolent change in the ruling elite 
with the participation of the population in mass political protest during the 
presidential election campaign. a rotation of the elite took place, which 
at first glance looked like the fall of the regime. The initial impression of 
a change in the Ukrainian ruling elite prompted even attentive Western 
researchers to conclude that the regime had fallen (Aslund). 
We can analyze the events of November–December 2004 in Ukraine 
from a broader perspective through the prism of transition. If we use the 
classical three-stage model of transition proposed by Philippe Schmitter 
and Guillermo O’Donnell (1986, pp. 6–14) and adapt it somewhat to local 
conditions, the explanatory potential of the model remains quite high. 
This model regards the liberalization of the old regime as the beginning 
of the transition. In Ukraine, as in the Soviet Union as a whole, liberal-
ization began at the end of the 1980s. True, Ukraine lagged somewhat 
behind Moscow in starting perestroika; this was typical in relations be-
tween the imperial center and the republics. The failure of the putsch in 
August 1991 and the declaration of the sovereignty of Russia, Ukraine, 
and other republics of the former Soviet Union marked the beginning of 
democratization, the second stage of the transition.
From then on, reforms evolved differently in each republic. The Baltic 
republics effected the transition in a more continuous and linear manner, 
whereas in Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia continuity and linearity did not 
always apply. In Belarus democratization came to a halt when Aleksandr 
Lukashenko took power. In Ukraine and Russia reforms began to slow 
at approximately the same time—when Presidents Kuchma and Yeltsin 
were reelected for a second term. Some Western researchers find in this 
delay reason to speak of “hybrid” states that are inextricably mired in a 
so-called “gray zone.” Behind the façade of weakly marked democratic 
institutions, authoritarian regimes have emerged in the three Slavic re-
publics, each with its own special features. The Caucasus and Central 
Asia have also seen democratization stop and patrimonial domination 
and sultanism return (Eke and Kuzio 2000, pp. 523–47). Thus, the ruling 
elites in most post-Soviet states have put a stop to democratization.
The nonviolent change of leadership in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine 
(2004) laid a foundation for renewed democratization in these countries. 
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The not altogether peaceful change of leadership in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan 
and the failure of the opposition in the 2005 parliamentary elections in 
Azerbaijan and in the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus, however, 
indicate the arrest of the democratic impulse in the post-Soviet space 
(Silitski).
Transition theorists have worked out several models of transition. 
These models can be grouped into two general types: radical and 
moderate (or protest and tactical maneuver) (Bans 2007, pp. 102–3). 
Regime change has taken a radical path in countries where the old elite 
has completely lost legitimacy. In this case, regime change takes place 
either through abdication (the renunciation of power), as occurred in 
1989 in Czechoslovakia and East Germany and in 2003 in Georgia, or 
as a consequence of mass protest and/or violence, as in 1989 in Romania 
and in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan.
The moderate variant of transition requires an electoral victory by the 
opposition, which either negotiates with the old elite ways and means 
of conducting reforms or permits representatives of the old elite to enter 
the government. The latter route is quite long. Moreover, if the old elite 
retains its official positions, it may delay or derail democratization—as 
happened in Ukraine after 1991. The failure of the attempt to create a 
democratic coalition in 2006 and the formation of a government that 
included representatives of the preceding regime indicate the continu-
ation of the aforementioned tendency and yet another postponement of 
democratization.
Special Features of the Ukrainian Variant of Transition
First, the transition in Ukraine is more prolonged and uncertain than the 
transitions in the East European or Baltic states and therefore belongs 
to the fourth, inverse wave of democratization (Fisun 2006, pp. 134–50; 
McFaul 2002).
Second, the transformation of the political regime zigzags, with 
more marked pauses and deviations than in Eastern Europe or the 
Baltic region. Thus, according to the international nongovernmental 
organization Freedom House, the collapse of the “Orange coalition” 
after the 2006 elections and the formation of a coalition headed by the 
Party of Regions demonstrated a decline in indicators of democratic 
change in Ukraine. The same trend continued in 2007–10 (nations in 
transit 2010).
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Third, the opportunity to initiate real reform in all areas of social life, 
which followed the change of leadership in 2004, was subsequently 
lost because of the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the elite. The 
“forced pluralism” of the Kuchma period led to intense rivalry not only 
between the opposition and the government elite but also within the lat-
ter. Instead of compromise and cooperation, the chief political players 
preferred to “play to a victorious finish”—that is, a “zero-sum game” that 
ended in everyone losing. The elite’s paradoxical behavior follows the 
logic of conflict escalation: the reward of victory (the post of president 
with expanded powers) appears greater than the cost of participation in 
conflict. No formal or informal rules limit the scope for using resources 
(national wealth) in this struggle. The results of intense elite rivalry be-
came manifest when the global recession began in late 2008 and Ukraine 
found itself among the countries worst hit by the crisis.
The country’s political elites demonstrated extreme egocentrism, 
irresponsibility, and lack of professionalism, which halted democratic 
reforms and in essence threw Ukraine back to the level of 2004.
The presidential elections of 2010, although on the whole open and 
competitive, did not (and, indeed, could not) bring qualitative changes, 
since the candidates competing in the second round were the leaders of 
the two largest business and political coalitions—the Party of Regions 
and the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc. The hasty actions of President-elect 
Yanukovych’s team in foreign policy (the refusal to join the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), security policy (the declaration of 
nonaligned status), and cultural policy (the campaign to revise history 
according to the Russian model) indicate that Ukraine is increasingly 
deviating from the vector of democratic development and falling under 
Russian influence.
The periodization of transition (political and social transformation) in 
Ukraine can be provisionally defined as follows. The first stage—liber-
alization—lasted from the late 1980s to 1991. The second stage—“dem-
oligarchization,” or the power of financial–industrial groups behind a 
façade of formal democratic institutions—lasted from 1991 to the end 
of 2004. During this period, Soviet nomenklatura authoritarianism was 
transformed in Ukraine into contemporary clan–oligarchic authoritarian-
ism.4 Several political–economic groups arose, grew stronger, and in fact 
captured the state.5 The third stage (2005–10) may be described as the 
“postrevolutionary crisis,” exacerbated in 2008 by the global economic 
crisis. The defining feature of this stage is a change in the elite—the 
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second since 1991 but an incomplete one—that resulted from the Or-
ange Revolution; its essence is rivalry among business–political groups 
combined with a desire to remain in power while maintaining a positive 
image among citizens. The democratic impulse of the Orange Revolution 
produced a few substitutions in the highest echelons of power—that is, 
in the composition of the ruling elite—but did not bring the anticipated 
change in its quality. We should note, however, an increase in political 
competition and pluralism, an expansion of media freedom, and the 
emergence of a civic political orientation among the inhabitants of most 
regions of the country (materialy). 
The fourth stage began in 2010 with the election of Yanukovych as 
president of Ukraine. The president’s first steps in domestic policy dem-
onstrate a desire to restore political stability and improve state control 
of the country—from above, by administrative means. As a result, we 
may call this stage “bureaucratic stabilization.” Although these initiatives 
will probably rationalize the mechanism of state administration, they will 
not bring about qualitative change, because post-Soviet bureaucrats are 
implementing them using the old administrative methods.
It is hard to predict with confidence how the transformation will end 
and how many more stages there will be. Taking into account the nega-
tive factors that appeared in 2008–10, both domestic (the political and 
financial–economic crisis) and foreign (the global recession), we should 
not count on a rapid restoration of stability or on the continuation of 
democratic reforms.
Change of Leadership or Change of Regime?
Before the Orange Revolution Ukraine had a weak oligarchic authori-
tarianism, but the Yushchenko presidency transformed the regime into a 
“defective democracy,” which differs from a liberal democracy in three 
respects: political participation, political competition, and constitutional-
ism (observance of the Constitution by all the chief political players and 
guarantees of citizens’ rights and freedoms [Merkel’ and Kruassan 2002]). 
Under Yushchenko democratic rules of the game were not generally ac-
cepted, and defective democracy did not turn into liberal democracy.
To substantiate this thesis, I propose to compare formal and informal 
institutions (rules for exercising power)—that is, what I regard as the key 
characteristic of the political regime—under the Kuchma and Yushchenko 
presidencies. The constitutional separation of powers among the main 
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representatives of the state is customarily regarded as a formal institution, 
whereas informal institutions (political traditions and practices manifest 
in the style of political decision making, in the political accountability 
of the authorities, and in the recognition and observance of rules) evolve 
in response to cultural and historical factors and are specific to a given 
country.
What Has Changed
On 1 January 2006 amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution of 12 Au-
gust 2004 substantially limited the powers of the president, as indicated 
by the Index of Presidential Power, and strengthened those of the prime 
minister.6 In fact, the prime minister became the key player in the politi-
cal system. The redistribution of powers intensified rivalry between the 
president and the prime minister and between the Cabinet of Ministers 
and the parliament. The ineffectiveness of this political reform led to a 
serious institutional crisis in April–June 2007, to a legally dubious dis-
solution of parliament, and to another political compromise, the essential 
provision of which was the decision of the leading political players to 
conduct unscheduled parliamentary elections in September 2007.
Political intrigues in Yushchenko’s entourage came to the surface, 
showing that the president’s team did not wish or was unable to keep all 
internal processes under control. Nevertheless, these intrigues do attest 
to the greater openness of the then-current leadership by comparison 
with the Kuchma presidency.
The official rhetoric has changed: the idea of stability has given way 
to that of reform.
The authorities’ attitude toward the mass media has changed, and their 
position in the country has improved.
The beginning of the Yushchenko presidency brought improved coop-
eration between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Soon, 
however, the authorities’ interest in civil society noticeably cooled. 
What Has Not Been Done
The government has not completed a single investigation into the involve-
ment of highly placed officials in falsifying the results of the presiden-
tial elections. It has not prosecuted any highly placed official for acts 
of corruption. It has not completed its investigation into the murder of 
Georgii Gongadze. 
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It has not reformed the law-enforcement agencies and has overhauled 
the judicial system only in part. Citizens in detention and under pretrial 
investigation continue to have their rights violated.
It has not set up the public broadcasting system that “Orange” repre-
sentatives touted so often. 
The list of promises made but not fulfilled under President Yushchenko 
could be extended. Here I highlight only points that, if implemented, 
would have affirmed the “values of Independence Square” and thereby 
demonstrated changes in the principles guiding the exercise of power. 
What Remains Unchanged
The style of political decision making remains as opaque as before. 
Yevhen Zakharov, chair of the board of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group 
and co-chair of the Kharkov Group for the Protection of Human Rights 
notes that over ten months in 2005 President Yushchenko issued forty-
two decrees stamped “For Official Use (FOU)” [dlia sluzhebnogo 
pol’zovaniia]. The president issued five of these decrees after 1 April 
2005, when he publicly promised to abandon this practice. In the same 
period, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted thirteen resolutions and instruc-
tions with the “FOU” stamp (Zakharov 2005, p. 17). Hence, as Zakharov 
notes, the use of illegal stamps continues, although on a smaller scale 
than under President Kuchma. Other striking examples of the opaqueness 
of decision making are the agreement of 4 January 2006 on deliveries of 
gas to Ukraine and the election results for the Speaker of the Supreme 
Rada on 6 July 2006.
The practice of noncompetitive appointment of candidates to official 
posts at various levels continues. This marks a failure of the personnel 
policy of the new leadership, in contrast to the successful reform of per-
sonnel policy undertaken after the change of leadership in Georgia.7
The regime has not brought corruption, as a systemic phenomenon, 
under control. On the whole, ties between state representatives and citi-
zens continue to be those of patron and client. According to the assess-
ments of Transparency International, in 2005 Ukraine came in 107th of 
158 countries in level of corruption. With an index of 2.6 on a scale of 
1 to 10 (the lower the index, the higher the level of corruption), Ukraine 
found itself grouped with Nicaragua, Palestine, Vietnam, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. In 2006 and 2007 the level of corruption declined, but by 
an insignificant margin. In 2006 Ukraine took 99th place with an index 
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of 2.8, but by 2009 it had already fallen to 146th place with an index of 
2.2—the worst since 2004, placing the country in the company of Rus-
sia, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe (report 2009). The public accusation 
by Prime Minister Tymoshenko that President Yushchenko covered up 
actions of the National Bank that led to a 50-percent fall in the value 
of the national currency relative to the U.S. dollar during the last three 
months of 2008 has less to do with the personal confrontation between 
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko than with the prevalence of corruption 
among the highest echelons of power (transcript 2008).
The regime has not disbanded agencies that monitor the telephone 
conversations of state employees, politicians, and individual citizens. 
According to Volodymyr Sivkovich (a Supreme Rada deputy represent-
ing the Party of Regions), in the first year of Yushchenko’s presidency 
about thirty agencies continued to extract information from communi-
cations channels (Program 2006). For comparison, the regime issued 
forty thousand permits for the extraction of information in 2002, and 
eleven thousand in nine months of 2005 (Zakharov 2005, p. 7). One 
example of this practice was the scandal when agents of the Ukrainian 
Security Service bugged the office of former Justice Minister Roman 
Zvarich.
The state did not alter its fiscal policy, including its chief institution—
the tax police.
Thus, the new leadership did not succeed in overcoming the “Kuchma 
legacy.” This result may indicate both the depth to which political corrup-
tion has penetrated all pores of society and the infection of the “Orange” 
authorities with this disease. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko’s inability to 
correct the defects of the Kuchma regime shows that they belong to the 
class of rent-oriented political entrepreneurs.
Due to the deteriorating moral foundations of the political class, ongo-
ing political corruption, the secrecy of political decision making, and the 
emerging confrontation between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko and their 
teams, a considerable number of citizens grew disillusioned with the “ac-
cidental democrats,” and the “Donetsk people” came to power.
I would argue that in addition to the constant indicators of a political 
regime mentioned above, an investigation of transitional regimes should 
include certain variables that offer a clearer explanation of such regimes’ 
nature. These variables include the structure of dominant groups (the elite) 
in the society; the status and condition of the opposition; and the political 
influence of noninstitutionalized interest groups. Both the governing and 
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the oppositional segments of the political class exhibited fragmentation, 
factionalism, internal conflict, and the absence of common values that 
might have provided a basis for developing a national consensus. The split 
within the “Orange” team made it impossible to form not only a unified 
campaign coalition for the 2006 elections but even a democratic majority 
in the Supreme Rada. In the impromptu parliamentary elections of 2007, 
the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and the Our Ukraine—Popular Self-Defense 
bloc together obtained over half of the seats in the Supreme Rada and 
with great difficulty created a “democratic coalition.” In many respects, 
however, the personal, tactical, and strategic interests of Yushchenko and 
Tymoshenko and of their teams did not coincide, and this led to serious 
confrontation and disagreements on key issues of domestic and foreign 
policy and the collapse of the coalition in September 2008. This collapse 
in turn ushered in political chaos and economic crisis.
The status of the opposition remained unregulated, although its po-
sition had markedly improved by comparison with Kuchma’s second 
presidential term. The complaints from representatives of the Party of 
Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine regarding political repres-
sion by the new leadership after the 2006 elections should be taken as a 
sign of change in the position of the opposition rather than as evidence 
of political revenge (although this possibility cannot be excluded in 
individual cases).
The influence of noninstitutionalized interest groups on Ukrainian 
politics and decision making diminished somewhat by comparison with 
the period before 2004. The interest groups themselves continued to exist, 
however, and new ones appeared.8 The most powerful of them—namely, 
the political and business empire of Rinat Akhmetov—is today the fi-
nancial motor of the Party of Regions, which in the elections of 2006 
and 2007 received more votes than other parties and blocs. Viktor Yanu-
kovych, the leader of the Party of Regions, consolidated this success in 
the 2010 presidential elections.
It is obvious that in “Orange” Ukraine, the fundamental rules of the 
“political game” did not change after the replacement of the highest 
state officials and many second-tier members of the power elite (chairs 
of oblast and raion administrations). Only one component of the regime 
changed—those exercising power.
The horizontal constraints on the regime weakened (interactions 
among the branches of government deteriorated). Whereas Kuchma 
exerted substantial influence on the legislative and judicial branches and 
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thereby dominated the political space, under Yushchenko relations among 
the branches became competitive, even conflictual in nature. At the same 
time, the opposition’s influence on politics markedly increased. The 
competitive or “forced” pluralism existing in Ukraine did not, however, 
turn into organic democratic pluralism.
Vertical constraints remained almost unchanged. After the mass politi-
cal protest in late 2004, civil society’s influence on the state considerably 
weakened. At the same time, both government and opposition forces 
used populist actions to manipulate public consciousness. Examples 
of such actions were the Tymoshenko government’s campaign to repay 
the savings of former Soviet Sberbank depositors and the anti-NATO 
rhetoric used by the parliamentary factions of the Party of Regions and 
Communist Party of Ukraine and injected into society through the Rus-
sian and Russian-controlled Ukrainian mass media.
One can argue, therefore, that the political regime changed only in 
terms of its participants, which in turn transformed it from weak patri-
monial-oligarchic authoritarianism to defective democracy. The institu-
tions that govern interactions among participants have not undergone 
fundamental change.
To verify the thesis of the inertial nature of the regime, I use the 
indicators of regime change developed by the British nongovernmental 
organization Policy Exchange (regime change). Specialists at this center 
have proposed seven indicators of regime change. These indicators, for-
mulated as questions, make it possible to verify the extent of change, if 
any, of a given political regime. A regime is considered to have changed 
if it has broken sharply with personnel, structures, and policy of the 
previous system. 
Indicators of Regime Change
(1) How successfully and unequivocally did the process remove the senior 
leadership of the old regime? answer: Successfully.
(2) What kind of qualitative change was brought about within the 
original support structure (senior bureaucracy, armed forces, judiciary)? 
answer: Some, at the middle level.
(3) Was there an effort to deal with the social, political, and economic 
remnants of the past? answer: No.
(4) Did a new elite structure emerge, and how did this marry with the 
objectives of the initial regime change? answer: About a third of the 
political elite has been replaced.
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(5) Did the process affect a change and dispersion of economic power? 
answer: No.
(6) Was there a measurable growth in civil society? answer: Yes.
(7) Did the process establish free and fair elections/a new constitu-
tion/an independent and effective system of governance? answer: Yes, 
but the old problems remain.
General appraisal: The leadership changed, but serious changes in 
the methods of exercising power did not occur.
The inertial influence of the institutions of the old Soviet regime 
shaped Ukraine under President Kuchma. Throughout the Yushchenko 
presidency we observed use of the same methods and rules for exercis-
ing power. Previous practices and institutions retained their influence, 
while new ones—lustration, tax reform, administrative-territorial reform, 
reform of local self-government—were not introduced. An analysis of 
constant and variable indicators of the political regime in Ukraine and 
of indicators of regime change yields grounds to define the regime as a 
weakly institutionalized (defective) democracy in which informal rules 
prevailed over formal institutions.
We encounter a similar definition of the contemporary political regime 
in Ukraine in the appraisals of Freedom House experts (nations in transit 
2010) (see Table [1]).
Table [1] was compiled from periodic assessments conducted as 
part of a special Freedom House program in twenty-seven postcom-
munist countries. In the methodology of the assessments, Table [1] 
Table [1]
Indicators of the State of Freedom and Democracy in Ukraine
Indicators 1997 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Electoral process 3.25 4.25 3.50 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.50 3.50
Civil society 4.00 3.75 3.00 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75
Independence of mass 
media 4.50 5.50 4.75 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50
State administration 4.50 5.25 5.00 4.50 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00
Local government — — 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.25
Constitutional order, 
laws, judicial system 3.75 4.75 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.00
Corruption — 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75
Scale of democratization 4.00 4.88 4.50 4.21 4.25 4.25 4.39 4.39
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indicates full compliance with standards of democratic governance, 
while higher values describe increasing levels of noncompliance. A 
political regime whose summary indicator (on the scale of democ-
ratization) lies within the 1–2 range is defined as a “consolidated 
democracy”; a score around 3 is a “semiconsolidated democracy”; 
a score near 4 corresponds to a “transitional government or hybrid 
regime”; a score close to 5 indicates a “semiconsolidated authoritarian 
regime”; and an indicator in the 6–7 range suggests a “consolidated 
authoritarian regime.”
On the whole, the transformation that has taken place in Ukraine 
should not be considered in linear terms. In my view, it would be more 
correct to speak of a zigzag pattern of political transformation. In 
this regard we can discern two divergent processes. The first involves 
changes in political institutions that lead to democracy. The second 
indicates movement in the opposite direction—toward the preserva-
tion and development of authoritarian institutions. In other words, 
the trajectory of the political regime in Ukraine over the 1991–2008 
period should be viewed through the prism of democratization and 
oligarchization. This trajectory can be presented schematically as a 
series of zigzags between poles that may be labeled provisionally 
“democracy” and “authoritarianism” (see Figure [1]).
Figure [1] presents Robert Dahl’s model of the transformation of 
political systems in the form of a diagram (Dal’ 2002, pp. 9–13). The 
diagram shows that when political competition and political participa-
tion increased, the Ukrainian political regime drew closer to democracy. 
When these processes halted, both the formal and the informal rules for 
exercising power (the regime) acquired an authoritarian character. 
Special Features of Politics in Ukraine in 2005–9
The leadership change in November–December 2004 initiated a new 
stage of social and political transformation, but it slowed and gradually 
gave way to a crisis. At the same time, a decade of authoritarian stability 
ended. The political trend markedly accelerated. Using the terminology 
of David Easton, we may say that the political system was not ready 
to react to the numerous challenges emanating from the domestic and 
foreign environment. The governmental crisis of September 2005, the 
parliamentary and governmental crisis of January 2006, the parliamentary 
crisis of July 2006, the institutional crisis of April–June 2007, the systemic 
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Figure [1]. Evolution of the Political Regime in Ukraine
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crisis of September–December 2008, and the numerous episodes of ten-
sion with Russia—these are the main political upheavals that Ukraine 
has undergone in recent years.
The Orange Revolution was one factor upsetting the geopolitical 
equilibrium in Eurasia, previously maintained by Russian domination. 
Moscow perceived the leadership changes in Georgia and Ukraine as a 
threat to its ambition to restore its former power by implementing the 
model of a “liberal empire” and transforming Russia into the key supplier 
of energy resources for many European and most post-Soviet states.
On the eve of the 2010 presidential elections, I examined two possible 
scenarios for political events. Each of them presupposed the introduction 
of constitutional amendments—that is, changes in the formal rules of 
the political game.
The first scenario presupposed the election of an opposition politi-
cian as president and the further strengthening of presidential powers to 
overcome the recession and ensure political stabilization. Depending on 
the identity of the elected president, this scenario envisioned a transi-
tion either to a presidential–parliamentary or to a presidential form of 
governance. If the political and economic crises were overcome, it might 
become possible to strengthen democratic rules and procedures and later 
September–
October 2007
198
9
199
1
1999
1994 2000–2001
2004
Statist authoritarianism
(low competition, high participation)
Totalitarianism
(low competition, low participation) 
Democracy 
(high competition, high participation)
Nov.–Dec. 2004
28 russian  politics  and  law
abolished. It would then be possible to form a prime ministerial (“chan-
cellor’s”) government in a parliamentary–presidential or parliamentary 
republic. Again, overcoming political chaos and economic crisis would 
open up a real opportunity to consolidate democracy. Both scenarios 
envisioned a stronger executive power vertical, which allowed for a 
“slide” toward authoritarianism. This development of events, however, 
seemed to me less likely.
Today, a year after elaborating these scenarios, I realize that I made an 
important error. It was difficult to imagine that anyone would make sys-
temic political decisions (the means of forming a parliamentary coalition, 
the signing and ratification of agreements for prolonging the presence 
of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol) in open violation of operat-
ing rules and procedures. It is now clear that the competing oligarchic 
groups united in the Party of Regions, having acquired control over key 
institutions and branches of government, will act without formal, consti-
tutional, and moral constraints to maximize their short-term profits. The 
state, increasingly regarded as an instrument for the extraction of profit, 
is losing its purpose as a political entity. All the talk about resetting the 
system through compromise and an agreement to “play by the rules” has 
become meaningless. The reset is occurring by illegal means, compel-
ling us to consider other scenarios. I referred to one of them above as a 
“slide” toward authoritarianism.
The possibility of this scenario stems not from formal amendments 
to the constitution or from an enhancement of presidential powers, but 
from actions by Yanukovych aimed at creating a unified power vertical 
under the control of a single political force. In fact, Ukraine has already 
reverted to a presidential republic even though the powers of the president 
have not changed. Is it possible that in the absence of a united opposition, 
control of the parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, and the Constitutional 
Court will reintroduce authoritarianism?
Despite the numerous warnings that have appeared recently in the 
Ukrainian mass media, a reversion to authoritarianism still seems to 
me unlikely. Most of the structural and procedural constraints that have 
slowed movement toward democracy will also impede a slide toward 
authoritarianism.
First, Yanukovych no longer possesses Kuchma’s presidential powers. 
Even if he manages to regain such powers by means of a referendum, 
he will find it quite difficult to achieve full control over the oligarchs 
and the opposition.
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Second, even if he does regain such powers and establishes control over 
key state institutions, the oligarchs, and the opposition, this will not guar-
antee control of the information space and the public mood. Freedom of 
expression and the conditions under which the mass media operate have not 
attained the standards of a liberal democracy, but they ensure incomparably 
greater access to information than in Belarus or Russia. In this sense, the 
Yushchenko presidency did not live in vain. Although democratic institu-
tions have not struck deep roots in Ukraine, most Ukrainian citizens would 
object to restrictions on freedom of expression and on political participation 
and competition, and therefore the likelihood of mass protest will hang 
like a sword of Damocles over the president’s head.
Third, the state has neither an effective apparatus of compulsion nor a 
professional bureaucracy. Without these two institutions an authoritarian 
regime cannot exist, as it is impossible to ensure full control over the 
state. Training and reform of the bureaucratic apparatus and security 
agencies cannot be accomplished quickly: this requires time, a unified 
political space, and a consolidated society and elite. If there were a desire 
to conduct reforms, the experience of Georgia might prove useful. The 
first hundred days of the Yanukovych presidency, however, suggest that 
it has no such desire.
Fourth, Ukraine’s traditional schisms impede any return to authori-
tarianism. These schisms are civilizational—between European and 
Eurasian identities; religious—among several faiths and churches; 
ideological—between nation-state and postcolonial status for Ukraine; 
geopolitical—between the European and Russian centers of gravity; 
and, finally, political—among competing segments of the elite and 
noninstitutionalized interest groups. The deep fragmentation within 
the elite made it difficult for its members to “play by the rules” during the 
Kuchma and Yushchenko presidencies. The same problem will prevent 
Yanukovych from creating a unified political space, which is a neces-
sary condition for establishing an authoritarian regime. So the absence 
of national unity, which slowed Ukraine’s progress toward democracy, 
will impede its imposition of authoritarianism.
Fifth, neither the West nor Russia wants to see an authoritarian regime 
in Ukraine. The European Union (EU) pays lip service to the spread of 
democracy and liberal values, but in practice it cooperates with dictators 
to ensure its supply of oil and gas. Even so, the EU does not want another 
authoritarian country on its borders. Although the EU and the United 
States have “grown tired of Ukraine,” they know what awaits them if 
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Ukraine turns into “another Belarus.” The Kremlin, for its part, also has 
no interest in seeing a second Lukashenko emerge in Kiev. The Russian 
leadership benefits if Ukraine slides ever deeper into Russia’s shadow 
while embroiled in constant crises and problems. It can always offer 
assistance to such a country and advise its leadership on what to do. 
Finally, a “failed state” is an instructive example and a sort of “lesson” 
for mobilizing and manipulating Russia’s own population.
Which scenario seems most likely? In my opinion, the threat to Ukraine 
is not authoritarianism but bureaucratic–administrative arbitrariness, 
which manifests itself in state employees of various ranks ignoring the 
law and abusing their official positions, in increasing corruption and a 
contracting public sphere. The rational strategy for the population in this 
situation is adaptation, not resistance. This kind of gradual “Zaireization” 
(a term borrowed from Alexander Motyl) may reduce the state to per-
forming only fiscal, oversight, and repressive functions and eventually to 
Ukraine becoming a failed state. If the new president and prime minister 
fail in the fight against the political and economic crisis, we may see even 
worse consequences: the development of political pathologies—that is, 
deeper crises, more intense political conflicts, the erasure of all rules of 
the political game, and the resulting collapse of the system.
At the end of the Yushchenko presidency, we asked how the elite 
could be compelled to play by the rules. After the first hundred days of 
the Yanukovych presidency, this question sounds irrelevant. The team 
that has come to power will not and does not wish to play by the rules. 
Now we have to think about how we can avoid the loss of our state and 
its descent into the black hole of lawlessness. What can we do to pre-
vent this? The tried-and-true method in the fight against arbitrariness 
is civic self-organization, the development of horizontal networks, and 
the defense of political and civil rights along the whole “front line.” The 
experience gained during the decade of the Kuchma presidency is not 
yet lost. Let us make good use of it!
Notes
1. For a more detailed account of the discussions among Western researchers 
concerning the essence of the political regime in Ukraine, see Kuzio 2005, pp. 
167–90.
2. I survey publications on this theme and propose an alternative explanation 
for the events leading up to 2004 in Ukraine using the category of transition in 
Matsievs’kii 2005a, pp. 7–22; and Matsievs’kii 2005b, pp. 29–39.
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3. For a more detailed treatment of theoretical explanations of revolution, see 
Matsievs’kii 2005b, pp. 29–39; and Fisun 2006, pp. 179–207.
4. An explanation of the special features of political transformation in Ukraine 
that is close but not identical to mine has been undertaken by Aleksandr Fisun 
(2006).
5. The thesis that Ukraine may be considered a “captured state” is well estab-
lished in the literature. See, for example, Omelyanchuk 2001.
6. The Index of Presidential Power, calculated by the method of Lars Johannsen 
and Ole Nørgaard, stood at 40.4 points, as compared with 47.7 points before the 
constitutional amendments. The maximum number of points is 60 (Mozol’ 2010). 
7. See the articles by Iu. Mostovaia, S. Rakhmanin, and N. Pestriakovaia in the 
Ukrainian weekly Zerkalo nedeli, 2005, nos. 1, 3, and 17. 
8. See Zerkalo nedeli (www.zn.ua/1000/1550/60724), and the articles by 
N. Guzenko and E. Struk in Kontrakty (http://kontrakty.com.ua/show/ukr/full_
main/402008.html). [URLs accessed 2 June 2011.—Ed.]
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